

DE: Assuming that Khrushchev was concerned about an invasion of Cuba there are several questions. One of them is this. In actual fact an invasion was scheduled, or not scheduled, but possible for early October.

MIKOYAN: But Khrushchev couldn't know it.

DE: No. But his whole premise was that he feared an invasion of Cuba right?

MIKOYAN: Yes. Maybe because, I explain this in my contribution to the book, "On The Brink," I think they called it. Well, in the beginning of 1962, in Punta Deresta, they excluded Cuba from the OAS. Then there was a campaign in the press and a campaign in the Congress against Cuba. And Operation Mongoose was of course, it was not known as it's known now, but of course, it was felt.

DE: And penetrated, they had people inside it, the Cubans had people inside it.

MIKOYAN: So all this could give them both them, Fidel and him...

DE: Yeah. And there were exercises during the year. There were many exercises.

MIKOYAN: Yes, and this exercise on the island of Ryekis, but the name ~~ORTAK~~^{SC}, Operation ORTAK, Castro, ORTAK.

DE: Now here is the question which I've never seen anyone address. All this pointed toward an invasion in October, September or October, or perhaps in October, or September. Yet the missiles would not be ready and would not be disclosed by Khrushchev until November or December.

MIKOYAN: By November.

DE: What if the invasion came before he had disclosed the missiles? I've never seen anyone ask that question.

MIKOYAN: Yes, but he couldn't know the dates. He couldn't know the dates. He couldn't know about October.

DE: No, but that race, there was always the possibility. In other words, if he says, I'm going to disclose this in December, the obvious question is... what makes you think the invasion will wait that long? Who says the invasion is scheduled for after December or November? What if it's earlier? Then they'll catch us with our mater... with the missiles there not even set up.

MIKOYAN: Well, he... of course he did not know when...

DE: No, he didn't know. So he has to address the question.

MIKOYAN: Invasion could have taken place before his talk with Kennedy about missiles, or after, he didn't know.

{ But he didn't want to undermine the pre-electoral position of the democratic party of Kennedy.

DE: Why not?

MIKOYAN: Because he, I think all of us, of course all the population but also Khrushchev they saw in Kennedy an intellectual with whom you could talk, and not as difficult to talk as Dulles, for instance. And much better than Nixon who competed with him.

{ DE: And yet as Kennedy pointed out, the material that was openly going into Cuba, not missiles, but other things, were giving Kennedy a lot of trouble. As Kennedy said to Dobrynin, you are giving me a lot of trouble before the election. It was the number one issue of the election.

MIKOYAN: By what steps?

DE: By bringing in lots of ships filled with military materiel, including surface to air missiles.

MIKOYAN: But defensive.

DE: Defensive, but even so it was giving Kennedy a lot of trouble.

MIKOYAN: But this was necessary in connection with...?

DE: To prevent the invasion.

MIKOYAN: Expected invasion, and Fidel repeated and repeated that we are awaiting it each day.

DE: Exactly. Now the question I have is when did they expect the invasion, before or after the election? The logical time is before the election to get the benefit of it.

MIKOYAN: From the American point of view, yes. But if the invasion is very fast and very successful. But since it could not be very fast, so...

DE: See, what's clear in retrospect is that Kennedy was considering an invasion before the election, so the question is...

MIKOYAN: You think so?

DE: Oh, absolutely. Because of this planning that was being done in October. Moreover, all of the Mongoose planning, you couldn't know this of course, the Soviets couldn't know this, but in fact all of the Mongoose planning talked about a possible invasion in October, which means before the election, in time for the election. Now the question is, did the Soviets consider the possibility or likelihood of an invasion or attack? It might have been an attack, before the election?

MIKOYAN: No, I don't think so. And we can... you see, we don't know the atmosphere inside the states, so much. But still we think that if the... it's invasion of two days with the 50 GI's killed, it can be done before. But if it's a long war with heavy losses of the United States, it's better to do it after elections, after the elections. For instance, we were afraid of some things which could be done by, for instance by the... by who was that? What president. But in the time between the beginning of November and the inauguration of the new president we thought this was, in our country it was a very widespread opinion, that when a new man is elected but not yet inaugurated, it's an excellent time to do everything. We think so, I don't know, maybe I'm

start
before.

Anger
"Z words".

WWR.

mistaken, because the old... the old man is still in power. He can give orders and the new man is not yet responsible. So they could talk with each other. And say, "Well, you begin it. I'll finish it."

DE: It's an interesting theory with some basis, but of course '62 was not a presidential election. It was a Congressional election.

MIKOYAN: No, this is my... yes, I understand that there was elections to the Congress.

DE: Congressional elections.

MIKOYAN: Congressional elections.

DE: So there's no interim then, there's no inauguration.

MIKOYAN: Of course, it's not connected with the 1962. I only would like to express our vision of the American ways of doing...

DE: I'll tell you that comes up in the following way. Walt Roshtow wrote a memo after the crisis to President Kennedy, saying that he had an impression that Khrushchev

[BACKGROUND INTERRUPTION]

MIKOYAN: What time is the best time for such actions?
Before elections or after elections? After Congressional
elections.

DE: It's also easier...

MIKOYAN: Because if that they are say, you won, then you
can begin a war which will be maybe heavy --

[TAPE CUTS]

MIKOYAN: Bush raided Noriega not because of any
elections.

DE: No elections this year, you mean, yeah, right.

MIKOYAN: But in case there were elections, everything
depends upon the result of the adventure. For instance,
with Iranian hostages, yes. This was an excellent action
if it succeeded, for the President. I mean.

DE: Well, actually, since you're considering so closely,
let me add a wrinkle there. See, actually they would
figure very closely on such things in the White House
even though they deny it. They deny that elections would

effect the timing, but the elections would be crucial to the timing, in fact. But it would come in at a slightly... in this slightly complicated way. When you say, if it could be a short action it's one thing, if it's a long action it's another thing. But the first...

MIKOYAN: [INAUDIBLE]

DE: But you're thinking of the final result. But in fact, if the invasion were let's say, days or a week, or even two weeks before the election, you could, on the one hand be sure, from past experience that the initial effect would be very supportive of the President, would be very good for the president's party. The initial, for a matter of days up to a week or two, however it went, the public opinion would support the president very strongly. So even if it went, even then if it turned out to be, like Korea, a long, prolonged event that turned badly, that would be after the election. The effect of that would not be felt until after the election. It would be too late to pay a cost for that. So if it's only a week or two, it doesn't matter whether it's over or not. Even if it's not doing well, you can still be sure the public will support the president.

MIKOYAN: Excuse me, but you forget that Khrushchev wanted to talk with Kennedy immediately after the

missiles were installed. And had with him an agreement about the public announcement after the elections. So I do not exclude that Khrushchev maybe was going to talk with him in the end of October, when he got the information that all the missiles were installed and...

DE: I didn't follow you, you say you do not exclude or include what? He expected to tell Kennedy after the missiles were all installed which would be after the election, right?

MIKOYAN: No, no, no, before that.

DE: Before the election?

MIKOYAN: Before then, yes. He wanted to make this public after the elections, public. But to tell...

DE: But he might tell Kennedy before.

MIKOYAN: Yes. To send the _____ to him, and...

DE: As soon as they were in.

MIKOYAN: As soon as he gets the information that the missiles are ready.

DE: And what did he expect Kennedy to do with that information when Khrushchev informed him before the election let's say, what did he expect Kennedy to do?

MIKOYAN: His idea was to talk with him friendly. Explain to him that this was not against the United States. This did not mean the intentions of Russia to make a first strike or to attack the United States, but this is only to defend the island and also as you have your missiles near our borders we have now them not far from your borders, so it's normal.

DE: Right. And what did he think then Kennedy would then say and do? Would he announce it before the election?

MIKOYAN: No, after the election. After... he would announce after the election.

DE: So he expected Kennedy to keep the thing secret.

MIKOYAN: Yes. Yes.

DE: Now do you know that or just guess that? What do you base that on?

MIKOYAN: I know that. .!./

DE: How do you know that?

MIKOYAN: I know that from my father, and from the memoirs of Khrushchev also.

DE: It's -- in the memoirs in the U.S., the memoirs that have been published in the U.S. he doesn't make that clear when he expected to tell Kennedy. But maybe in Sergei Khrushchev's fuller form, in the larger form does he go into that more.

MIKOYAN: Well, I don't know exactly. I must have a look, but it's absolutely for sure that I know this from my father that this was the idea.

DE: And this is very interesting to me and I'll explain to you why, but just to pursue it further, he was then expecting the missiles to be ready before the election, is that correct?

MIKOYAN: Yes.

DE: Now the IRBM's, the longer range ones, which had not yet arrived, there was some question when they would be fully ready wasn't there? Was he going to wait until they were all ready or until some were ready?

MIKOYAN: No, I think it was enough to have... I don't remember how many were there? 26 or...

DE: Yeah. Just to have some ready. He didn't have to have them all. He might have told Kennedy before they were all ready. Is that correct?

MIKOYAN: Yes.

DE: Now, why tell him before the election and make him keep them.... and expect him to keep it secret? Why not tell him after the election? Not to embarrass him.

MIKOYAN: Because it will be in his own interest not to make it public.

DE: Not to make it public. Why?

MIKOYAN: Because of the elections.

DE: Was there not a concern that Kennedy would feel that he could not keep it secret? Could he keep it secret? Now we're at a very crucial point here.

MIKOYAN: The psychology of people in the Kremlin is that everything can be kept secret. They could not understand

the American ways of doing things, you see, and the American difficulty with secrets.

DE: So they felt sure they could keep that secret.

MIKOYAN: Yes. But actually, XCOM (?) kept it secret for one whole week.

DE: Yes, for a week, right. Now the question is, but there's a reason for that. No, I mean they were able to keep it secret because of what they were doing, which was preparing an attack on Cuba. If Kennedy had made a decision to do nothing about the missiles, that secret would have been out within 12 hours. I can even name some of the people who would put it out.

MIKOYAN: If he decided not to risk...

DE: If he said, we are not going to do anything.

MIKOYAN: Ah, so you mean that he would be betrayed by generals?

DE: The generals and the intelligence people, would have told the republicans...

MIKOYAN: They would give a leak.

LB/Russell

DE: McComb would have told the republicans, the director of Central Intelligence. It is believed to this day that McComb^{nc} was the source to Keating, though that's not sure. It may not be the case, but Kennedy believed that his own director of Central Intelligence had told Senator Keating this. That the missiles were there. But if Kennedy had said, "We're not going to do anything..?"

MIKOYAN: But this was before he got the information?

DE: That's right.

MIKOYAN: If it was in September.

DE: That's right because they didn't expect Kennedy -- Well no, Keating didn't actually say the missiles were there until October. He was saying that he expected them to come and he did say SAM's were there early, and they might be there, but he didn't... when he said, I...

MIKOYAN: Do you think that McComb^{nc} had some information or just rumors?

DE: Two things. It's really not known for sure, but do you know about this French, the French agent, Vojolis of... the head of the French Intelligence who had a

mission in Cuba, an intelligence mission in Cuba. And he's written his memoirs. He was speaking to McComb^{ne} at that time and he said that he knew there were missiles from his agents in France on the ground, that there were missiles there.

MIKOYAN: So it was information which was not absolutely for sure. But...

DE: That's right. It was not accepted by CIA totally.

MIKOYAN: Yes, but still...

DE: But the French believed it. See, it was a question of whether you believed these reports. You had the reports. And in fact some of the reports turned out to be true, but it was a question of whether you believed them or considered them a threat. But what I'm saying, I won't spell it all out now, but if you want a small theory, a predictive theory as to when a secret can be kept and how long and when it cannot be kept, one can do a very reliable theory on that, which I suspect the Soviets did not understand. That's one of my suspicions.

MIKOYAN: Absolutely.

[TAPE CUTS]

DE: I want to give you an interpretation eventually of how this fits. I think it's very important what you're saying. But I'd rather ask you some questions first so that I don't put the answers in your mouth, get the answers from you to make sure that... which seems to be the case. To recapitulate here just to review. As I understand it, Khrushchev felt confident that, or definitely expected to reveal these missiles to Kennedy before the election.

MIKOYAN: Yes.

DE: And he expected... he expected to do it when the missiles were in and he was timing it so that the timing was such that they should be or most of them should be operational before the election. Didn't you say in Blake's book that it was a little unclear when he might reveal, that he might have revealed later, for instance at the time of the U.N. meeting in December or something.

MIKOYAN: Dependent on the end of the works, on the missile sites. If, suppose they were not finished until the elections. He will not disclose it.

DE: He would not disclose it?

MIKOYAN: Yes, yeah.

DE: Okay, next question. And he expected Kennedy to keep that secret till after the election for his own domestic political reasons, right?

MIKOYAN: Yes.

DE: Do you know of any discussion as to whether that was an uncertainty or risk that Kennedy might feel he had to reveal it earlier or might choose to reveal it earlier, or anything?

MIKOYAN: No, I don't think, [UNINTELLIGIBLE].

DE: They just assumed, they assumed?

MIKOYAN: They assumed that we shall begin the construction as soon as possible. Then, as soon as it is finished we talked with Kennedy and after the elections. Perhaps if the works, for instance, were finished on the eve of elections, they would prefer to wait until after the election.

DE: But you're just speculating there.

MIKOYAN: Two days, three days.

DE: Here's where they did have a choice, I would think, the following way.

MIKOYAN: Excuse me but the idea to talk with Kennedy as soon as they are installed, that if the United States' Intelligence discovers it without Krushchev's notice, it's worse.

DE: You want to tell him as soon as possible.

MIKOYAN: Yes, in order not to let him know from other Intelligence.

DE: It was considered then that there was a possibility that Intelligence would discover it.

MIKOYAN: This was the idea of my father, why he was against it. He said, in May, that they will find out before you want them to. So, this is very risky.

DE: Everyone must have considered this as a possibility, not one could say that was impossible, could they?

MIKOYAN: Well, strange but when that commander of our strategic missiles, what was his name? Bizoff(?), yes.

Biryuzov

MBG: Your father argued that in May?

MIKOYAN: May.

MBG: In '62, remarkable.

MIKOYAN: Then, Bizoff(?) was sent to Cuba first to talk with Fidel Castro in order to find out his opinion, his agreement and to find out if there was a possibility to install the missiles without America to find out about them. So it depended upon the landscape. And my father knew the landscape and he said, it's impossible because all the island is very well seen and the palm tree are not like Amazon River forest. But then that man commander came from there and said - everything is excellent. Fidel said yes and the landscape is very good for such kind of.

DE: I've heard that, now I want to pursue this, you'll see why. This is really significant. And you'll see why, what I'm asking in a moment. They did consider the possibility, since you just said, let's tell him as soon as possible since we don't want him to discover by himself, by themselves on their own, it's better that we tell them. So they considered the possibility that the U.S. would discover them even if they thought that was very unlikely and they weren't thinking much about it.

What did they think Kennedy would do and second what did Khrushchev think he would do, if he thought it through, in that case? And what I'm asking now, is not only the overall reaction, but what would Kennedy say - did they make this assumption - if the Intelligence discovered the missiles before being told, would Kennedy reveal this, did he expect, to Khrushchev or would he reveal it publicly or would he conceal it? How did they think he would do on the revelation of these missiles? Who would he tell and when, why?

MIKOYAN: I'm afraid they even did not consider such.

DE: So he was going to tell, alright. How was the overall timing of sending them determined? Were they just sending them as soon as they possibly could from May on, having made the decision basically in May, how did they determine when to make them ready?

MIKOYAN: The decision was reached in May but then Raoul Casar(?) came here for detailed talks and they concluded a kind of agreement.

DE: Yeah, in July was that?

MIKOYAN: I think August. I can be mistaken but I think it was the beginning of August.

DE: So from the point they made the agreement, how did they determine when to send them? Did they just send them as quickly as possible?

MIKOYAN: Immediately after that agreement was taken by Raoul to Fidel. You see it was signed only by Raoul and it had to be approved by Fidel. So he went to, Raoul went to Havana and Fidel said yes, though he did not sign it. Acutally, he did not sign.

MBG: He never did?

MIKOYAN: Never did but he said yes. After that, our ambassador Alexai got the information that they permitted us to bring missiles. In September they began to arrive.

DE: Question, was any consideration given by anybody to having the SAMS operational before the missiles arrived? I know this point has been raised before, but it's a crucial point, did anyone consider making the surface to air missiles operational and thereby keeping the U-2s from flying before the missiles were brought in?

MIKOYAN: Were they not operational?

DE: The SAMS? The SAMS became operational at the same

? time as the missiles. They brought them in simultaneously. So the U2 had been flying. Well, McCone(?) had always expected them to send missiles. But he didn't expect the missiles to come until after the SAMS were operational because once the SAMS were operational then the U2 couldn't fly. So, he didn't expect them in October when they appeared.

MIKOYAN: It's logical but our big behavior was not logical.

DE: It may be that any one person, even if you or your father might not know a particular point like this. I want to pursue the logic. This is not a minor point. This is very obvious. If you're trying to keep the thing done, keep them from observing it, then you want to keep the U2 from flying. And you can keep the U2 from flying with SAMS, no problem. And moreover, nobody can really object to the SAMS. So, that's a very straight forward thing unless you were, for some reason, and this is under very great time pressure, there is simply no reason to bring the missiles in at the same time as the SAMS unless there's very great time pressure. In fact you could go this far. If you're going to bring the missiles in, in October, why bring the SAMS in at all? The SAMS will not prevent an attack on the missiles, if there is going to be an attack on the missiles. They'll just come anyway.

SAMS are only good for keeping the U2 away. They're very good for that. If you're not going to try to do that, why bother to bring in SAMS. So the logic is very strong here. There was simply no point in bringing the SAMS at the same time as the missiles. This leads me to raise a question that for some reason, he was in a great rush to get those missiles in early. I'm going to ask the question now. I have never seen in the literature at all, what was the rush? Now, one could say, well the rush is to prevent the invasion. Okay, that could be the reason. But that runs into the following paradox, that if you are expecting an invasion any day or any week, as you should have expected, that it was at least a high possibility that it would come before the election.

Maybe the Russians made a different assumption, that it will not come till after the election. If so, if they were very confident of that, that was a very great miscalculation. That was a big miscalculation - that he'll wait till after the election. It's not silly, not foolish to think that might be the case or even that it's probably but to assume that, that was sure to be the case is way off the mark. That would have been very foolish. So, first I can ask the question - did they feel confident foolishly, confident that it would be after the election, if at all? Or did they consider the possibility that it would come before the election?

MIKOYAN: I don't know exactly. I can only guess that since he wanted to make together with Kennedy some kind of an announcement after the elections, so he didn't expect this attack for sure.

DE: Well, he didn't expect it for sure but did he think it was impossible before the election.

MIKOYAN: This, I don't know.

DE: If he had considered, as he should have.

MIKOYAN: Perhaps if he expected it before, he could have thought that after the missiles are ready, I talk with Kennedy. This will be one week or ten days before the election and he will stop his _____.

DE: Given what the Soviets knew and what Castro knew which is, there are exercises, including an exercise scheduled in October, for about October 20th, that's the ORTSAK(?) exercise. ORTSAK(?) was scheduled actually to start the 22nd of October, the day the missiles were announced, either that or the 15th.

MIKOYAN: Do you think that instead of maneuvers, they could instead of this?

DE: I think the maneuvers were probably a cover. In fact, that's in the papers. That's in the documents.

Admiral Anderson speaks of the possibility saying that our preparations for a possible invasion will be masked or covered by this maneuver. And the entire maneuver could have been a result of, just shift the whole thing over. Just shift the boats over to Cuba. I landed on Viakess(?) myself. I've planned invasions of ^{Vieques.} Viakess(?). Do problem, just turn the boats over and land them on Cuba. Moreover, Castro himself, as I recall reading, was worried that the invasion might come earlier, as early as September or October. Isn't that true?

MIKOYAN: Yes.

DE: So it would seem they had to consider the possibility that this would happen, that some military letter, there had to be.

MIKOYAN: But they were preparing all their forces. They gave arms to the population.

DE: Castro?

MIKOYAN: Yes, yes.

DE: That's fine for Castro. But now here's what I'm

saying, here is the strange situation that it was developing. You have to think in terms of time line here. Here is time and here is, let's say, the decision in August, alright. Here's the election in November. The decision is made. The missiles actually start to come in around September 15th, somewhere around there. This is the November election. The plan is to tell Kennedy sometime in here, when the missiles are ready, sometime say, I'll just make an indefinite range like that. And then to tell Kennedy here, tell Kennedy after they're ready, okay. Tell JFK. Now, look at this. You're now in a situation where Castro understands correctly that the invasion may come any time here. In fact it could have even come sooner, but could have come any time, the possible invasion. You've made a decision where if the invasion, we don't know that you're putting missiles in. We don't know that until we get told, unless we should find out, which, now, they are no longer considering. Say, okay, the Americans are not going to find out. Put that out of mind. That means you've got a period here, September, October, maybe six weeks, during which we don't know the missiles are there. They're going in. They're 40 thousand Soviet troops going in, the U.S. doesn't know. And not knowing that, there's no deterrence, the U.S. may invade ...

MIKOYAN: In case of invasion they meet our troops.

DE: They meet your troops without knowing you're there and they capture your missiles. They attack the place and they discover missiles on the ground. That would be very interesting. You're not deterring them all this time. You're not deterring them.

MIKOYAN: Nuclear warheads came, not in the beginning.

DE: Not the warheads but the missiles. The missiles are there, no warheads. In other words, you're heading for the worst conceivable situation.

MIKOYAN: It's very interesting but first of course came the troops, 42 thousand. Americans thought that there were only 13 or 14. There were 42 thousand.

DE: And they thought there were no combat troops, they thought at first. They thought there were just support troops. We knew there were support troops there.

MIKOYAN: That was the army especially designed to defend the missiles.

DE: Exactly.

MIKOYAN: They were fully armed for combat.

DE: Let's consider an option that the Soviets had, which they didn't do apparently. One would be to tell the U.S. that in addition to all the defensive stuff you were sending like the frog missiles and this and that, even the IL28(?) and the SAMS, in addition to all that, you were sending some direct Soviet combat troops. Once, you got them there, why not tell the U.S. right away that you had done that? That would be deterrent wouldn't it?

MIKOYAN: Yeah, sure.

DE: It would also be a provocation but at the same time, it would show the U.S. that the Soviets were directly involved, directly committed and there would be war with Soviet troops. Now, you have ²~~to~~ alternatives.

MIKOYAN: Forty thousand people are there, our army.

DE: We can ask two questions: first, why are the troops not sufficient, if Cuba were all they were concerned about, not at all the balance, strategic balance, one could say - why not just send the troops alone? That's enough of a deterrent. If you're not worried about evening the balance at all, why bother with the missiles? Just send the troops, if you're willing to send troops. Was that ever considered?

MIKOYAN: Do you think that it would have been as strong as the missiles?

DE: I would think very strong. The missiles do work both ways. Soviet troops and Cuba can't threaten the U.S. So they don't change the situation very much. They really are only defensive. Those can only be defensive. So they don't give you much of an excuse to invade. If you're looking for an excuse to invade, they don't give you an excuse. The missiles are both a deterrent and an excuse. So, I'll tell you an answer to this and you can reflect on it. The Americans of course, always assumed that the strategic balance was the overwhelming reason. I agree with you that that's almost surely not true, if you follow me. That the strategic balance was the overwhelming reason. You believe that's not the case and I agree with you, that's not the case. Some people, perhaps yourself, think only Cuba mattered. The missiles are very unimportant. The balance is very unimportant. I think that could be true but the point I'm raising cuts against that. It suggests that, from the very beginning, evening the balance, not only the balance but this right, the parity of right. Soviets, U.S. gets to put missiles on our borders in Turkey then we get to put missiles on your border in Cuba. So there's that parity of right-right. And then there is the actual strategic

balance or the perception of it. I would suspect that both of those were in Khrushchev's mind as factors from early on because otherwise if you were thinking only of Cuba, if he said to himself, as he says in Bulgaria or even earlier - what can I do to help defend Cuba?

There's an obvious answer - send troops. (and two more -

which I (Khrushchev?)
didn't know about!
Dahlgren (Khrushchev?)
Khrushchev?)

MIKOYAN: [INAUDIBLE COMMENT].

DE: Send a hundred thousand troops, that's a very good deterrent. Forty thousand is not a token already. So, if you're willing to send, you might say five or ten thousand is of some significance but it's a token. It's a token of commitment it's a trip wire. But he wasn't sending five thousand. He was sending forty thousand, that's no trip wire.

MIKOYAN: But in case of air strike.

DE: Forty thousand troops, you don't take those out in an air strike. You don't take them out at all with the air. Remember what our air did to the forty thousand North Vietnamese troops. We never found any of them as far as I'm aware except when they were attacking. When they were attacking somewhere you knew where they were, you could go hit them. Otherwise, forget it. You can't hit them from the air. The troops alone would have been

quite adequate for a deterrent. If you're willing to send as many as 10, 20 or 40 thousand troops or more, then you've got your deterrent there. There is no problem. And moreover, there's no provocation. See, we were saying that we didn't want to invade Cuba. Kennedy was saying that. So how can he object to troops? What's the problem? They're just there in case, to defend them. So, we accepted the notion of Russian specialists in the hemisphere. So, how could you really object to troops? So, all I'm saying from that is, that to my mind that supports the idea that he wanted the missiles there in addition, not just for deterrence, partly for deterrence but not only for deterrence.

MIKOYAN: Mainly for deterrence.

DE: Mainly for deterrence if you like but also for the balance and evening of rights.

MIKOYAN: Yes, I agree.

DE: You see, until Volkogonov and other revealed it, no
(998? Americans knew that he had, just two years ago, we didn't know he was willing to put 40 thousand troops there. But if he was, then there it is. He's got his deterrent. Moreover he had the option, say he's going to send both, he has the option of revealing the troops as fast as they

get there because and thus deterring the invasion.

MIKOYAN: Excuse me.

DE: If you're writing down options, I would say - one option would be just troops, only troops. Another option would be troops and missiles but reveal the troops as quickly as you can. You can get the troops there before the missiles I presume. Do you know when the troops actually landed?

MIKOYAN: I think they were first to come.

DE: Before September 15th or at the same time?

MIKOYAN: With the first ships.

DE: With the first ships, okay. Now, it's going to be a while before you have the missiles in place. So why not reveal the troops as soon as they arrive?

MIKOYAN: They were concealed because they were just
_____.

DE: They concealed them very well but why were they concealed and why were they kept concealed? Maybe to get them ashore is one thing. But once they're ashore, why

not reveal immediately? The reason being that there may be an attack not because the U.S. knows the missiles are there but because the U.S. doesn't know the missiles are there. So, they're not deterred. I can sum this up. So far as I'm aware, the Soviets made no effort at all on the ground, physical effort, to deter the U.S. from attacking between September 15th or before that, from August on to November. As a matter of fact, if anything, they were giving them a reason to invade because there was all this build-up of Soviet help which the Republicans were complaining about. And the Republicans said, - that's reason enough to invade. They were giving that as a reason to invade, pressing Kennedy.

MIKOYAN: Missiles or?

DE: Before missiles, before that, they said - we don't need. They didn't talk about missiles. We should invade anyway with all this Soviet build-up. So this is a paradox.

MIKOYAN: Perhaps they were afraid to reveal that army of 42 thousand people in order not to give pretext for an attack.

DE: Well, once they're there, they're a pretty strong reason not to attack, compared to the other material.

Everybody knew when you attack soldiers on the other side, you've got a fight on your hand. It's one thing to attack their material, their goods, which is what the Republicans were asking for. But to attack Russian troops everyone knows, now, you're fighting Russians and nobody wanted to do that. So that could have been quite deterrent.

MIKOYAN: But Khrushchev could not believe this would.

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deter?

DE: He didn't believe?

MIKOYAN: I think so, he wouldn't believe.

[END OF SIDE A].